Abstract. -This article questions the traditional historiographical interpretation regarding a significant period of Mexican history, the so-called Maximato (1928)(1929)(1930)(1931)(1932)(1933)(1934)(1935), the era of Jefe Máximo Plutarco Elías Calles. Calles has often been labeled as quasi-dictator with total control over puppet presidents (peleles) from behind the scenes, actively imposing his agenda on Mexican politics. We argue that Calles's participation was more indirect, through his influence in the Partido Nacional Revolucionario (PNR), and analyze the different presidencies of the Maximato in order to show the complex system of shared power between president, party, and the Jefe Máximo.
Obregón overshadowed Calles yet again, succeeding in his bid for a second term. The weeks following July 17, 1928 , therefore, ushered in the most unsettled time in Calles's presidency. Most significantly, there was no heir apparent. Further, the assassination of Obregón interrupted US Ambassador Dwight Morrow's efforts to mediate the Church-state conflict. The Catholic Church continued its boycott of religious services, and the Cristiada continued into its third year. 2 For Calles, the greatest problem was that of the presidential succession. His closest advisers urged him to remain in office until new elections could be held, or even to serve another full term as president. 3 At first glance, continuing in office appeared the best option. However, there were good reasons for the president to step down on November 30, 1928, as stipulated. Leaders loyal to Obregón suspected Calles of having played a role in the assassination attempt. In addition, Calles had reason to fear that he might be the next target of an assassination attempt. 4 Calles definitively settled this issue during his last annual informe, or state-of-the-nation address, on September 1, 1928. The president began his speech by praising Obregón's role as a leader of the revolution, and he noted that the progress achieved during his own administration primarily followed the initiatives of his predecessor. Yet, in obvious allusion to Obregón, he also repeatedly referred to caudillismo as the source of his country's ills. After this clever combination of praise for Obregón and criticism of caudillo rule, Calles proclaimed that he would not serve as president again under any circumstances. Mexico, he stated, had entered the transition from a "country of one man" to a "nation of institutions and laws". 5 He asked congress to select an interim president until elections could be held to choose a successor. In rhetoric designed to nip thoughts of a military coup in the bud, he praised the military for its loyalty. In addition, the president called for the creation of a party that combined all national and re- gional revolutionary parties. Finally, he even welcomed the formation of a conservative party as a means of co-opting the Catholic opposition, which had insistently complained about its inability to press its agenda through legislative channels. 6 The next step consisted of the selection of an interim president, a process that involved obtaining the support of congress and the military leadership. In both cases, Calles confronted resistance as well as personal ambitions. Although Calles's speech had won over many members of congress, the leader of the Obregonista faction in congress attempted to elevate an enemy of Calles to the presidency. 7 The military proved even more difficult to control. Since Obregón's assassination, some of the more ambitious generals had held regular meetings at the Hotel Regis with a view of choosing a presidential candidate. The group reportedly discussed three particular generals as leading contenders: the independent Juan Andreu Almazán, the Obregonista José Gonzalo Escobar, and the Callista Manuel Pérez Treviño. Of the three, Almazán enjoyed the greatest wealth and the best political and military connections. 8 Concerned that the generals practiced caudillo politics as usual, Calles convened thirty of them in Chapultepec Castle. During this meeting, he asserted that the candidacy of a military leader would lead to more political and military conflict. He exhorted the generals to stay out of the process of choosing an interim president and to remain in active service, which would render them ineligible for the elections for the constitutional presidency. Face to face with the president and Calles loyalists such as Saturnino Cedillo and Lázaro Cárdenas, those generals harboring secret plans for a coup declared their support of the government. Most importantly, the president gained the reluctant assent of the generals for nominating a civilian, in Calles's view the only hope for political stability. Beginning with Almazán, one general after another declared that they would not seek the presidency, and Escobar finally did the same. Almazán also enjoined his colleagues to leave the selection of the interim president up to Calles and congress. It became clear that most of the generals were tired of fighting and eager to enjoy the fruits of a spoils system that had brought them material comfort -in some cases even phenomenal wealth. The vast majority of them had much to lose from ongoing strife, and they knew that Calles's call for their neutrality in national politics did not imply the loss of their regional fiefdoms. 9 Given these difficulties, it was not surprising that the nomination for the interim presidency went to a compromise candidate. On September 25, 1928, the chamber of deputies chose Gobernación Secretary Emilio Portes Gil for a term beginning on December 1, 1928, and ending on March 1, 1930. Elections for the constitutional presidency, from which Portes Gil would be barred as a current office holder, were slated for November 17, 1929 . Portes Gil, who had joined Calles's Consejo de Ministros after Obregón's death, was the leader of a regional agrarian party and former governor of Tamaulipas. A civilian Obregonista, he was acceptable to a majority in congress as well as the military. Portes Gil was by no means the ideal candidate as far as the president was concerned.
10 Calles could not control the nominee easily: Portes Gil drew strength from his regional base in Tamaulipas, and his candidacy received support from Agrarista leaders such as Antonio Díaz Soto y Gama and Aurelio Manrique, who had come to oppose Calles after Obregón's death. Thus, even if Portes Gil got the congressional nomination through Calles's influence, as most historians believe, the president's decision to support him rather than one of his own allies constituted an opportunistic reaction to the political lay of the land. In other words, Calles did not so much impose Portes Gil as he made a pragmatic choice that reflected the strength of Obregonistas in congress.
11 As a result, Portes Gil approached his short presidential term with a great deal of independence from Calles. For example, Calles accepted the nominee's demand for restoration of an agrarian reform fund that had been deleted from the 1929 budget.
With the question of the interim presidency settled, Calles moved toward the founding of a national ruling party, the Partido Nacional Revolucionario (PNR). In the late 1910s and early 1920s, the Partido Liberal Constitucionalista had aspired to such a role, as did the Partido Nacional Cooperatista in subsequent years. Both the PLC and the PNC, however, had ended up as vehicles of presidential ambitions rather than broad-based parties. Forging a durable ruling party therefore required uniting the diverse political elements beyond individual ambitions. In particular, such a party would need to unite the foremost groups in the revolutionary political elite. The evolution of the PNR to a mass-based party was a long-term process. It was not until the late 1930s that the party effectively incorporated the major agrarian and labor movements as well as the multitude of regional parties that existed within the PNR.
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Most immediately, the PNR needed an organizing committee and a candidate for the 1929 presidential elections. The planning for the new party began at the Mexico City residence of Calles loyalist Luis L. León on November 21, 1928, only ten days before Portes Gil's inauguration. At the meeting, Calles asked all those in attendance to remain in their respective political offices through November 21, 1929, which barred them from the presidency.
14 This maneuver appeared to clear the way for ex-Secretary of Foreign Relations Aarón Sáenz, the former head of Obregón's presidential campaign and the only one present who did not hold political office at that time. On December 2, a manifesto published in all major newspapers announced the formation of the PNR and invited all those loyal to the revolution to join the new party.
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The organizing committee drafted a program and a set of statutes to be approved at the first PNR convention scheduled for March 1929 in the city of Querétaro. Committee members also traveled throughout the nation to invite the existing parties to apply for PNR affiliation, a status that would allow them to send delegates to the Querétaro convention and, hence, wield influence in the choice of the next president. PNR affiliation also gave leaders the exclusive right to act in the party's 234 Jürgen Buchenau name. 16 Reflecting a desire to give broad appeal to the new party, the organizing committee crafted foundational documents that invoked the populist rhetoric of Calles's first years as president. As the draft program stated, "[...] the PNR is the instrument of political action by means of which Mexico's great campesino and worker masses fight to keep the control of the public power in their hands; a control wrested from the landowning and privileged minorities through the great armed movement that began in 1910". 17 Or, in the words of the Declaration of Principles:
"The PNR [...] will endeavor to improve the situation of the popular masses by enforcing Articles 123 and 27 of the constitution, as the party considers the working and campesino classes the most important elements of Mexican society". 18 In large part for that reason, Sáenz did not succeed in obtaining the PNR nomination at the Querétaro convention. Although Sáenz appeared to enjoy a crucial advantage in the form of the right political connections, his political views constituted a liability. Sáenz, the brother of Calles's daughter-in-law and business partner of the Calles family, stood on the right of the PNR. His tenure as governor of Nuevo León had been marked by tax cuts, business deregulation, and other measures that favored the state's beer and steel industry. 19 For that reason, Portes Gil and other leaders close to agrarian and labor interests opposed Sáenz's candidacy, including most of the significant regional power brokers close to Calles. As a result, Calles unveiled a second candidate, Pascual Ortiz Rubio, an ex-general who had been out of the country on diplomatic service since 1923 and hence did not enjoy the advantages of a political home base. Confident only hours before the opening of the convention, Sáenz withdrew his candidacy, and Ortiz Rubio easily obtained the nomination. 20 Although Sáenz quickly proclaimed his loyalty to the party despite his defeat, the lasting legacy of the nomination battle was the formation of clientelist factions within the PNR. In fact, as political scientist Luis Javier Garrido has demonstrated, the party was initially little more than a "confederation of caciques". 21 In this club that only imperfectly checked the ambitions of powerful generals, Calles's support for Ortiz Rubio had shown once again his willingness to jettison allies for his political aims as well as an astute sense of opportunity.
The Querétaro convention marked the triumph of Calles's strategy to construct a new political system in which he enjoyed power behind the scenes. One of his most trusted allies, Coahuila Governor Manuel Pérez Treviño, became president of the new party, and another Callista, Luis León, became secretary. Although Veracruz strongman Adalberto Tejeda -an inveterate supporter of agrarian aims disappointed in the presidential choices -defected from the new party, other Callistas headed up regional parties within the PNR. In a symbolic move that indicated the true hierarchy within the new party, León assigned Calles the first membership card issued by the PNR. 22 However, Calles's strategy immediately confronted a stern test. On March 3, 1929, the third day of the PNR convention, Pérez Treviño surprised the delegates with the news of a revolt headed by General José Gonzalo Escobar in Sonora. Under the banner of the "Plan of Hermosillo", a group of Obregonista generals called for the overthrow of the Portes Gil administration as a supposed instrument of Calles. The Plan of Hermosillo called Calles the "Judas of the Mexican Revolution" and accused the former president of waging a corrupt and repressive campaign to impose his will on the republic. 23 The Escobar Rebellion, which ultimately involved 28 percent of the Mexican army, was thus an essentially anti-Callista movement. The rebels seized the states of Sonora, Durango, Chihuahua, and Veracruz, among others, and they sought to enlist the help of the approximately 25,000 Cristero guerrillas in central and western Mexico. 24 Within three months, however, Calles and his allies had vanquished the Escobarista challenge, which was hampered by the low quality of its leadership and the ill-defined nature of its political goals. Since Secretary of War Joaquín Amaro was recovering from a polo accident that cost him one of his eyes, Calles himself commanded the government troops. Calles was able to strike quickly against the rebels after one of their leaders had made the mistake of inviting a Calles loyalist, General Abelardo Rodríguez, to join the uprising. Rodríguez's warning to Calles gave the government plenty of advance notice. 25 Focused on taking urban areas, the rebels were unable to coordinate a military strategy with the rural Cristeros, who preferred to keep their guerrilla war away from the cities. The end came in Sonora in late May, when Almazán and Cárdenas defeated the last redoubts of the rebellion. The third military revolt against the government since 1920, this rebellion eliminated many of the last recalcitrant divisionarios; it left Calles, who himself had used the military to come to power, disgusted with the military officers. In a speech on May 22, 1929, he admitted that the revolution had thus far failed in political terms, and he called for the elimination of the military from political life.
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The Escobar Rebellion highlighted the need for the resolution of the Cristero Rebellion, an uprising that had proven to be an intractable problem. The Escobaristas diverted federal forces from central and western Mexico and allowed the Cristeros to go on the offensive. After the defeat of the Escobaristas, Portes Gil combined an effort to bring the Church to the negotiating table with a new military operation against the Cristeros. The president's diplomatic effort had begun as early as March 1929, when US ambassador Morrow resumed mediation efforts that had been interrupted by Obregón's assassination eight months before. He knew that the clergy desired to resume religious services under a face-saving compromise. In Portes Gil, the Church found a president amenable to dialogue with Apostolic Delegate Leopoldo Ruiz y Flores. The president insisted that he would not amend the Calles Law that required the registration of priests, but he let it be known that he did not intend to destroy the Catholic Church. In May, Ruiz y Flores broke ranks with the Liga Nacional de la Defensa de la Libertad Religiosa and entered into negotiations with Portes Gil, with Calles and Morrow serving as informal advisers. Morrow even drafted position papers for both sides that served as the basis of discussions. 27 Meanwhile, the army dealt the Cristeros a crushing defeat in Jalisco, dispersing the rebels to neighboring states. 28 This combination of diplomacy and military force finally brought the Church-state conflict to an end. On June 21, Portes Gil and Ruiz y Flores announced an agreement that ended the Church's self-imposed ban on religious services that had been in effect for almost three years. Although the anticlerical laws remained on the books, church bells once again tolled over Mexico, and soon thereafter the Cristeros put down their arms. 29 The end of the Cristiada marked the passage of a turbulent year in which Calles and his allies had reshaped the political landscape. The death of the last great caudillo had created a political vacuum that offered the threat of continual conflict, but also the opportunity to create a new political system that demanded loyalty on the national level in exchange for giving political leaders continued leverage in their regional fiefdoms. A fledgling party had appeared as the country's most significant political institution, and Calles retained considerable influence behind the scenes. The question of just how powerful the expresident would be in this new system, however, awaited a definitive answer over the next several years.
THE HEYDAY OF THE JEFE MAXIMO
A partial answer to the important question over Calles's influence emerged during the 1929 presidential campaign. In this campaign, PNR candidate Ortiz Rubio confronted José Vasconcelos, the former secretary of education, who ran on an anti-Calles, pro-Catholic platform. Ortiz Rubio thus confronted a candidate far superior to him in terms of national recognition and intellect. The only way this colorless and relatively unknown politician could win the election was to promote the PNR as the authentic heir of the revolution. Ortiz Rubio's presidential bid, the first to feature six months of almost nonstop travel by the candidate, therefore turned into a marathon to advertise the new party. In this endeavor, the PNR candidate held up Calles as the defender of the principles of the revolution. In Tulancingo, Hidalgo, he announced that "Calles and [Portes Gil] are consolidating the conquests of the revolution", and in nearby Necaxa, Puebla, he held up Calles as a "good, sincere man dedicated to the [Mexican] people". 30 As a result, Ortiz Rubio's triumph on November 17, 1929 , by the official count of more than 1.8 million votes to 106,000 for Vasconcelos, can be considered the true beginning of the Maximato. Marred by widespread fraud, the elections ushered in an era in which the party (and Calles behind it) began to overshadow the presidency. 31 In large part, this lopsided tally could be attributed to the suppression of the Vasconcelos vote in urban areas. Brutal repression played a role as well, as the killings of sixty Vasconcelistas in Topilejo on the road from Mexico City to Cuernavaca demonstrated. 32 The effort to promote the party, which adopted the Mexican national colors as its own, included a strong symbolic component that tied both the PNR and Calles to the populist tradition in the revolution. Beginning with the 1929 presidential campaign, the PNR propagated a set of unifying ideas about the revolution, and most importantly, a historical interpretation that made Calles the patriarch of the revolutionary process. This rewriting of history to suit the party's needs occurred through its newspaper, El Nacional, public speeches, and newly constructed monuments. The key to Calles's place in this official PNR history was his position as the head of a "revolutionary family" -or as the "Jefe Máximo de la Revolución Mexicana", the Supreme Chief of the Mexican Revolution. 33 In his September 1928 presentation to the military, Calles had first made reference to the "revolutionary family", a term that would gain increasing importance as a unifying metaphor throughout the Maximato. 34 As the head of this revolutionary family, Calles enjoyed significant symbolic power. He met with members of the national government at his convenience, and on October 30, 1931, the state governors even gave a banquet in his honor. 35 The metaphor of the revolutionary family denoted not only the PNR, but also an official version of history. The revolutionary family combined all those who had fought for the revolution, and particularly leaders such as Francisco Madero, Venustiano Carranza, Obregón, Pancho Villa, and Emiliano Zapata. Conveniently for Calles, all five of these leaders had died by assassination. The notion of a revolutionary family was a historical artifact that ignored the fact that the latter four of these heroes had fought and, in some cases, even killed one another. As the actual fighting grew more distant in time, the dead revolutionary heroes could serve a useful political purpose for the claim of the PNR to political supremacy. Exploiting the martyrdom, or sacrifice, of these leaders, the new ruling party combined Villa's and Zapata's agrarian aims with Carranza's and Obregón's economic nationalism and Madero's commitment to political democracy. In party ideology, the road that had begun with Madero ended with Calles and the PNR. The dead heroes also allowed Calles to claim their legacy as the current head of the revolutionary family.
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The most unique aspect of the Mexican version of a state party lay in the complex relationship involving the president, the Jefe Máximo, the legislature, and the party. While other state parties bolstered the power of an executive branch headed by a dictator who ruled the nation by means of force, the PNR formed part of a system of shared government in which the president, the party, and the Jefe Máximo competed for power. When Calles departed for a six-month stay in France for health reasons, he therefore greatly strengthened Portes Gil's hand, and the president used the absence of the Jefe Máximo as an opportunity to step up a land distribution program that had languished during his predecessor's last years in office. In all, Portes Gil distributed 2.5 million acres of land to more than one hundred thousand households. 37 The Ortiz Rubio presidency was thus ill-fated from the beginning. In an ominous foreboding, the president was the target of an assassination attempt right after his inauguration on February 5, 1930. When the new president's Cadillac left the National Palace that afternoon, gunfire rang out. Of the six shots fired, one hit Ortiz Rubio's wife above the right ear and ricocheted to enter the president's right jawbone. The would-be assassin, twenty-three-year-old Daniel Flores, resisted all methods to make him talk, including torture and a faked shooting of his father. Nonetheless, public opinion implicated Gobernación Secretary Portes Gil (technically the next in line for the presidency) and, to a lesser degree, Calles, who had become a default suspect for all politically motivated assassinations.
39 Whatever Flores's motives for the assassination attempt, the incident crippled Ortiz Rubio's resolve to be his own man as president. After his near death, he understandably became tentative and frightful, and his general health deteriorated. 40 Thus, at no time did Calles wield greater influence than during the Ortiz Rubio administration. Whereas Portes Gil had enjoyed a degree of independence, as witnessed by his revival of the land distribution program while Calles was in Paris, Ortiz Rubio found himself besieged by a constant political crisis that forced him to rely on the head of the revolutionary family. Not only was congress in a state of upheaval, but his government also resembled a game of musical chairs. Calles, who usually weighed in with the forces arrayed against Ortiz Rubio, repeatedly made himself the peacemaker: during 1931 alone, he met twice with the Consejo de Ministros without the president. After the second of these meetings on October 12, all four divisionarios in the consejo -Almazán, Amaro, Cárdenas, and Rodríguez -resigned from their positions. This shakeup weakened not only Ortiz Rubio but also long-time Secretary of War Amaro. Many observers saw Calles's hand at work in Amaro's demotion to the directorship of the Colegio Militar, or Military College, a step that helped the Jefe Máximo assure himself of the loyalty of the only institution that could potentially threaten the dominance of the PNR. 41 Indeed, Calles served a third term as secretary of war, which seemed to corroborate the impression that the changes had been designed to get rid of Amaro. 42 In fact, however, Amaro had merely become a coincidental casualty in a larger power struggle that pitted Ortiz Rubio against the Jefe Máximo. 43 This power struggle also bore the marks of the personal ambitions of three divisionarios who had emerged as significant power brokers: future president Cárdenas, the conservative agrarian leader Cedillo, and eventual presidential candidate Almazán. 44 Despite the shakeup, the political crisis continued, and once the president had served long enough in office that a resignation would not trigger new elections, his position became untenable. In August 1932, Calles provoked Ortiz Rubio's fall over a hospital administration scandal that implicated the president's brother. The Jefe Máximo requested that no friend of his serve in the administration, a move that effectively blocked all prominent PNR politicians from service in the Consejo de Ministros. Ortiz Rubio then asked Puig, chief officer of the Federal District, to draft his resignation letter. On September 4, 1932, three days after giving his last informe to congress, the president re-242 Jürgen Buchenau signed from office. 45 Calles's heavy hand gave rise to the apocryphal story (still repeated in a current textbook) that Ortiz Rubio opened the newspaper one morning to learn that he had resigned. 46 This political crisis, however, was not just the product of Calles's own manipulations. Ortiz Rubio's tenure had coincided with the worst years of the Great Depression, which followed the collapse of the stock market on Black Friday, October 29, 1929. The Great Depression led to mass bankruptcies and layoffs throughout the United States and Europe, drastically reducing demand for Mexican raw materials. It also caused the repatriation and deportation of more than one hundred thousand Mexicans and Chicanos in the United States, including thousands of US citizens of Mexican descent. These displaced people swelled the ranks of the unemployed, which grew daily due to the lack of demand for Mexican exports. By 1930, Mexico -already hit by the slowdown of the late 1920s -experienced negative economic growth of four percent annually. The crisis led to a plummeting of government revenue, already down seven per cent from the beginning of the Calles presidency. Between the first and the last year of Ortiz Rubio's tenure, federal revenue dropped 25 percent in real terms. 47 The Great Depression deepened the chasm between the official party rhetoric and Calles's own, increasingly conservative political views. The economic crisis contributed to a steady drift to the right in the political persona of the Jefe Máximo, who increasingly leaned on Ambassador Morrow and US investors in an effort to blunt the impact of the depression. As presidential candidate, Calles had wrapped himself in the Zapatista banner and advocated land reform, and as president, he had confronted the United States in the oil controversy and over Nicaragua. The Jefe Máximo, on the other hand, scuttled further land distribution shortly after Ortiz Rubio's inauguration and continued a cordial relationship with Ambassador Morrow and his suc-243 Plutarco Elías Calles and the Maximato in Revolutionary Mexico cessor, Reuben Clark. Only in the areas of education and the religious conflict did his rhetoric still resemble the firebrand populism of the early to mid-1920s. 48 The economic downturn also scuttled continuing efforts to improve the situations of campesinos and workers, and it gave conservative Callistas the opportunity to use the crisis as an argument against reform. A good example of this dynamic is the halting of land distribution under Ortiz Rubio. In the spring of 1930, the new agriculture secretary, landowner, and Calles confidant Manuel Pérez Treviño seized upon a food crisis in which the volume of production had declined almost 25 percent as a pretext to halt further land distributions. 49 When Ortiz Rubio declared that further expropriations would be paid for in cash, this move effectively ended the Portesgilista effort to revive the land distribution program, as the government had no such cash. On June 23, 1930, a reporter overheard Calles remarking that the agrarian program was not working and that radical change was necessary. Although food production rebounded the following year, land reform -a significant pillar of the PNR program -languished for the remainder of the Ortiz Rubio administration. 50 Although Calles embraced this retrenchment from land reform, the decision to halt further distribution of land was not merely the Jefe Máximo's to make. By 1930, ongoing disputes about ejido land, declining productivity, and significant opposition to reform in numerous states had convinced many other national politicians to back off the ambitious goal of returning land to the campesinos. Thus, a dispassionate analysis of the Ortiz Rubio administration points to economic collapse as a chief contributing factor to its failure and Calles's role in it.
In hindsight, Ortiz Rubio's greatest achievement was the passage of the Ley Federal del Trabajo (Federal Labor Law) on August 28, 1931. This law expanded the purview of labor unions; it forced mid-sized firms to allow the establishment of unions; it codified the practice of asking foreign entrepreneurs to forsake the protection of their diplomatic representatives; and it established guidelines for the federal arbitration of labor disputes. Under Ortiz Rubio's direction, this law did not help workers to the extent that it promised, as the federal arbitration board declared most strikes "illicit" in view of the precarious economic situation. Nonetheless, the Federal Labor Law would play an important role in the mass mobilization of the Cárdenas years and hence constituted a step toward the incorporation of the workers into the state.
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Perhaps the best indication that Calles was not an informal dictator as traditionally understood is the fact that he spent most of his time outside Mexico City, and much of it in remote locations. In July 1929, after the end of the Escobar Revolt, Calles traveled to Paris for medical treatment and repose and did not return to Mexico until December of that year. Similarly, as hacienda secretary, Calles spent several weeks in a spa in Tehuacán. He also enjoyed staying at Aco's citrus hacienda in Nuevo León, and during the Rodríguez presidency he vacationed for months at a time on the president's ranch in El Sauzal, Baja California, and at his daughter-in-law's beach cottage in El Tambor, Sinaloa. 52 Finally, Calles bought a ranch in the city of Cuernavaca, fifty miles south of Mexico City. Located on what Calles critics knew as "Ali Baba Street" or "Street of the Millionaire Socialist", the house lay among a stretch of palatial homes inhabited by fellow politicians and wealthy entrepreneurs. 53 With its lush vegetation and warm climate, the ranch became his favorite residence when he needed to be near Mexico City. To be sure, party leaders, members of the Consejo de Ministros, and governors visited him wherever he went (except Paris). Just as Obregón had wielded influence by entertaining a procession of generals and politicians who came to Sonora to ask him for advice, so did Calles entertain a steady stream of visitors. Nonetheless, Calles did not keep close tabs on the political situation in the capital while at his redoubts in the north of the country.
The travels of the Jefe Máximo were in large part due to his deteriorating health. Calles had suffered from a rheumatic ailment since the siege of Naco in the winter of 1915, in which he had spent many nights outdoors in sub-freezing temperatures. This painful illness, however, only constituted the beginning of a long physical decline. By 1922, the pain in his right leg had intensified, and Calles subsequently visited a variety of physicians in France, Germany, Mexico, and the United States to find a cure. While therapeutic treatments and rest relieved the pain, it came back whenever Calles returned to work, a pattern that led French and German physicians to suspect neurological and psychological causes. Over the years, severe intermittent colic and insomnia added to these symptoms. It was not until 1932 that doctors discovered the nature of Calles's illness: a combination of arthritis, arteriosclerosis, and chronic intestinal disease caused by his poor diet. Together, the Jefe Máximo's ailments amounted to far more than results of the natural aging process, and the insomnia and the excruciating pain in his legs often forced Calles to the political sidelines. By the time of his diagnosis, he felt like an old man, at only fifty-five years of age. For Calles, this illness turned into yet another enemy, one that he confronted as stubbornly and futilely as he had the Cristeros. Instead of following his personal physician's recommendations that included a low-fat diet rich in grains, fruits, and vegetables, Calles persisted in eating meat, fish, and eggs along with the occasional tortilla and small amounts of juice. He defied his doctor's orders to give up coffee, alcohol, and tobacco, and he lay off his cognac and cigarettes only when the colic kept him awake at night. The Jefe Máximo's behavior typified his approach to both life and politics: a desire to get to the root of the problem paired with a lack of flexibility in the face of obstacles. 54 His health increasingly detracted from his attention to political issues.
THE MAXIMATO IN CRISIS
What later appeared like the sudden demise of the Maximato at the hands of President Lázaro Cárdenas and his followers constituted the culmination of a gradual process that already began during the pres -idency of Abelardo Rodríguez (September 1932-December 1934) . Indeed, the tenure of the third supposed pelele marked the beginning of the decline of the Maximato. Unlike Portes Gil and Ortiz Rubio, Rodríguez was one of Calles's friends and allies. With the possible exception of Sáenz, he had also profited personally from the revolution more than anyone else, having emerged as the wealthiest man in Baja California due to his control over the casinos, prostitution, and tourist industry in the border region. Rodríguez's political trajectory through various cabinet positions has led some historians to describe his time in power as the Maximato on autopilot, a time during which Calles enjoyed the luxury of having a trusted friend in office. 55 However, the Rodríguez presidency was a time of transition in which the power of the Jefe Máximo began to dim. Moreover, Rodríguez turned out to be more independent than Calles had imagined, using his mentor's extended absences from the capital to make his own mark. 56 Helped by an improving economic climate, President Rodríguez pledged to renew the reform drive interrupted by the crisis of the Ortiz Rubio years. His government promulgated the Código Agrario, or Agrarian Code, a body of legislation that united the disparate legislation on agricultural matters. He also resumed Portes Gil's effort to distribute hacienda lands to campesinos. Influenced by the new economic theory of John Maynard Keynes, which argued for consumer-driven growth anchored by deficit spending in times of economic crisis, Rodríguez established a minimum wage indexed to the cost of living in each state. Finally, shortly before leaving office, the foundation of Petromex, a private company funded by a state subvention, created the first Mexican oil company large enough to compete with foreign investors and safeguard the meeting of domestic demand for oil. 57 Over time, Rodríguez found out that he enjoyed far greater leverage than Ortiz Rubio. Much like Portes Gil, who had enjoyed political leeway when the Maximato was still under construction and Calles spent five months in Europe, the new president participated in a system of shared government in which Calles played a primary role within the party and Rodríguez ran the executive.
58 Four months after Rodríguez had taken office, the US military attaché observed that the president "is assuming more and more the responsibilities and decisions, which were formerly left to [...] Calles during the Ortiz Rubio administration".
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Despite the president's efforts to free himself from the influence of the Jefe Máximo, Calles continued to make his influence felt in the Rodríguez administration, and above all in the area of education. In 1933, Education Secretary Narciso Bassols, a close ally of Calles's, called for "socialist education" in the public schools. As understood by Bassols, socialist education constituted an aggressive rejection of religious education rather than the imparting of ideas of social justice, let alone the dialectic materialism taught in Soviet schools. Instead of teaching Marx and Engels -and in great contrast to the lay education imparted in US public schools and favored by Rodríguez -Bassols's curriculum confronted religious dogmas and sought to orient students toward a scientific view of the world. Predictably, socialist education produced an outcry from among the Catholic clergy as well as their parishioners. So strong were the protests against the new curriculum that Calles came to fear another Catholic revolt. Indeed, the controversy came on the heels of deteriorating Church-state relations after Pope Pius XI issued the encyclical Acerba Animi that bitterly attacked the Mexican government. 60 In May 1934, Bassols resigned from his post at Calles's urging after withdrawing the proposal for sex education from the primary and secondary school curricula.
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Calles had a similar experience with his efforts to centralize the new political system. Between 1932 and 1934, the Jefe Máximo sponsored two important initiatives: extending the idea of no reelection to the legislative branch and eliminating the parties and organizations that made up the PNR. Since the former idea directly challenged the prerogatives of leaders who represented the party in congress, it encountered considerable opposition. At an extraordinary party convention in the city of Aguascalientes, the delegates rejected Calles's plan. Nonetheless, the party ultimately bowed to the combination of popu-lar pressure and the Jefe Máximo's wishes, and in March 1933 congress amended the constitution to forbid consecutive reelection. This measure strengthened the party by preventing congressional seats from becoming sinecures of powerful bosses. In December of that year, the second national convention of the PNR in Querétaro ratified Calles's proposal to dissolve the constituent organizations of the party. The disappearance of these parties had equivocal results. On the one hand, the reorganization strengthened the PNR, which boasted 1.3 million members by April 1934; on the other hand, these regional parties "colonized" the national PNR, which found itself unable to enforce its directives at the state level. Calles's decision remain a subject of debate among historians, but his choice constitutes more evidence that he followed rather than directed political currents within the party. Whether he supported Cárdenas following the advice of his allies, whether he decided on a candidate with ties to labor and campesino organizations to defuse the mounting popular protests of his era, or whether he realized that Pérez Treviño faced insurmountable opposition, he gauged the sentiment in the party and acted accordingly.
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Without question, Calles believed that he could continue his informal role even with Cárdenas in office. In particular, he judged the candidate's relative youth an asset to him, as Cárdenas was only thirty-eight years old when he was nominated. Moreover, the Jefe Máximo took steps to bind the next administration to his agenda by suggesting that the party draft a six-year plan to assure continuity of policy. He sought to install none other than Pérez Treviño as chair of the committee in charge of drafting a plan that would, he hoped, be binding on Cárdenas as the presidential nominee of the PNR. In the end, however, Calles failed on both fronts, as a Rodríguez loyalist headed the committee, and supporters of land reform within the PNR amended the original draft in a direction more acceptable to Cárdenas. 65 Bolstered by the new plan, Rodríguez -although hardly a radical within the PNR -used it as his guiding program during his last year in office.
In response to these maneuvers by Calles, Cárdenas embarked on the greatest presidential campaign tour witnessed thus far in Mexico. He visited every state, stopping in both rural and urban areas to give campaign speeches and to become acquainted with the people over whom he was to rule. Unlike Calles, Cárdenas relished the opportunity to meet ordinary Mexicans and to listen to their concerns. During the campaign, his ability to connect with people from a variety of social backgrounds provided evidence of a charismatic personality that could renegotiate the terms that bound him to the party and Calles. As Cárdenas was running practically unopposed -a testament to the strength of the PNR -the purpose of this tour was to build a strong political base of his own. 66 Nonetheless, upon Cárdenas's inauguration on December 1, 1934, Calles fully expected to retain his informal role in both the PNR and the national government for years to come. As Jefe Máximo, Calles played a crucial behind-the-scenes role. After Obregón's assassination, he maneuvered himself into a position of arbiter of national political life. Read only six weeks after Obregón's death, his final presidential informe appeared a statesmanlike gambit in which he gave up an opportunity to prolong his term for the greater good of the nation. In fact, however, this gambit paved the way for a ruling party dominated by Calles and his allies. As head of the revolutionary family, the Jefe Máximo played a prominent informal role in this party as well as the national government. Political leaders often consulted with Calles directly, and no one interested in his political survival ever confronted him.
A unique political system at a time when authoritarian regimes arose in the rest of Latin America in response to the Great Depression, the Maximato was a system of shared governance in constant crisis. Calles's relative lack of popularity compared to other authoritarian leaders of his time and the fact that he exerted his influence from behind the scenes prevented the type of personality cult that enabled these leaders to rule by fiat. The man of steel was a political arbiter strong enough to topple potential rivals and prevent any legislation he did not agree with. Unlike the dictators of his time, however, he did not set the direction of government policy, nor could he stand in the way of presidential candidates, such as Cárdenas, who enjoyed widespread popular support. Even more importantly, neither he nor any other politician at the national level asserted effective control over the countryside, as Agraristas, Cristeros, and other groups took local politics into their own hands. Mexico remained a weak state throughout the 1930s, and the negotiation of power remained fiercely contested at the regional and local level.
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In this weak state, Calles's power rested on a different type of personality cult, one embedded in memory of other, more popular revolutionary leaders who had died as political martyrs. Never a hero of the masses, the Jefe Máximo, whose brooding, austere public persona did not endear him to most Mexicans, claimed the diverse legacies of Madero, Zapata, Carranza, Villa, and Obregón as his own. It was the historical artifact of the "revolutionary family" that afforded Calles the opportunity to claim political allegiance as the most prominent survivor of the revolution. His consultations with political notables therefore amounted to political rituals rather than command performances. The Jefe Máximo did not hold court in distant locales such as El Sauzal, El Tambor, and Tehuacán just to prove his mettle, as Enrique Krauze has argued, and one would be hard pressed to concur with Krauze's conclusion that Calles "moved the pieces of the national chessboard from his hideouts". 68 Instead, Calles fled the capital primarily for personal reasons, and his consultations with other politicians obeyed mutual expectations of benefit. Quite often, personal business matters rather than political issues dominated the agenda at those meetings. On some occasions, Calles even tired of his sycophantic visitors, who only desired to have their own agendas legitimi zed by his approval.
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The popular level, of course, was another matter. For most Mexicans, the Maximato was a period of economic crisis and social stagnation, a time in which the government paid mere lip service to the redemption of workers and campesinos. As the Jefe Máximo, Calles received his share of the blame for the failings of the revolution: the slow pace of land reform, the persistence of corruption and repression, and the failed emergence of a national, independent labor movement. From the bottom up, the PNR and the state over which it ruled appeared like a club of generals and career bureaucrats who monopolized power at the exclusion of workers and campesinos. As the foremost politician in both state and party, Calles became the target of increasing criticism as the PNR failed to fulfill its promises of economic growth and social justice.
Finally, Calles's role in the Maximato waxed and waned with the exigencies of the moment, the ability of the sitting president to negotiate some radius of action, and the Jefe Máximo's health. The first supposed pelele, Portes Gil, enjoyed a power base of his own among the campesinos of Tamaulipas. Portes Gil was also able to take ad -vantage of Calles's lengthy stay in Paris -a city too far away for even the most devoted Callista to visit on a regular basis. Without a doubt, it was during the Ortiz Rubio presidency that Calles enjoyed his greatest influence on the everyday workings of the government. Nevertheless, although Calles systematically weakened the president and ultimately brought about his resignation, he had to share power with Ortiz Rubio, the PNR leadership, and influential generals. Due to Calles's declining health, his own private wealth, and astute political maneuvering of his own, President Rodríguez was able to reclaim a significant degree of political power for his office. Historian Tzvi Medin's notion of the period as a "presidential Minimato" is therefore more accurate for the Ortiz Rubio government than for the other two administrations. 70 Indeed, as the Rodríguez presidency illustrated, one important key to the Maximato lay in Calles's ability to exploit economic crisis and social unrest in order to sustain a perpetual political crisis. Absent this crisis, which allowed him to use political differences and personal animosities among the governing elite for his own benefit, the scales of power shifted away from the Jefe Máximo. During the Ortiz Rubio presidency, his strategy of dividing the political leadership against itself rested in large part on the fiscal difficulties of the Mexican state and the constant challenges by campesinos and workers unhappy with the broken promises of the revolution. Once the state's financial situation improved in the Rodríguez administration, the president enjoyed a greater degree of leeway of addressing his country's social problems and, hence, reducing his dependence on Calles.
The Rodríguez presidency therefore marked the beginning of a period of transition to a political landscape without Calles. Without detracting from Cárdenas's considerable political acumen, this analysis of the Jefe Máximo's role in Mexican politics demonstrates that Cárdenas came to power at an auspicious time for a challenge to the Maximato. In December 1934, Calles was a tired and sick man older than his years, a survivor of a turbulent quarter century rather than a visionary to lead the country into the future. Many Mexicans were ready for him to retire.
